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The E¤ect of University Fees on Applications, Attendance and




Over the past two decades, large changes have been introduced to the level of university
fees in the UK, with signicant variation across countries. This article exploits this variation
to examine the e¤ect of fees on university applications, attendance and course choice. It nds
that applications decrease in response to higher fees with an elasticity of demand of about  0:4.
Attendance also decreases. The reduction in applications and attendance is larger for courses
with lower salaries and employment rates after graduation, for non-STEM subjects and for less
selective universities.
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1 Introduction
The cost of a degree is an important determinant of the decision to apply to university. In the UK,
there have been signicant changes in the level of tuition fees in the last two decades, with substan-
tial variation across countries. Before 1998, the cost of a university degree was entirely supported
by the government. Since then, students in England have been asked to pay an increasingly larger
share of the cost of higher education, while students in Scotland do not have to pay any tuition
fees.
This article uses variation in tuition fees over time and across countries in the UK to study the
e¤ect of fees on university applications, attendance and course choice. I focus on the most recent
and largest policy change: the increase in fees in England from $3; 375 to a maximum of $9; 000
per year in 2012.1 This change in tuition fees is larger than most reforms previously studied for
other countries. The very large magnitude of the reform, combined with the fact that it did not
apply uniformly across all UK countries, makes this policy ideal for estimating the causal e¤ect of
tuition fees on applications and attendance.
The change in tuition fees was accompanied by other policy changes regarding student funding
 changes in maintenance loans and grants were introduced for students from low-income families
and the National Scholarship Programme (NSP) was introduced to widen participation. Because
these changes in funding were implemented at the same time as the increase in tuition fees in
England, the estimates in this paper cannot untangle the pure e¤ect of fees from all other changes
in policy that occurred simultaneously. Therefore, the results should be interpreted as identifying
the causal e¤ect of the increase in fees and accompanying changes to student funding.
I estimate a di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DD) model using administrative data on applications
by English and Scottish students and on the number of undergraduates at English and Scottish
universities. I nd that the increase in fees (and accompanying changes in funding) introduced in
England in 2012 reduced applications by 18:7% and reduced the number of rst-year undergraduates
by 10:9%. Because the increase in fees was pre-announced in October 2010, students may have
decided to apply to university earlier to avoid paying higher fees. To test for anticipation e¤ects,
I estimate the model including leads and lags of the treatment indicator. I nd no evidence of
1All gures reported in this article are expressed in nominal prices.
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an anticipation e¤ect for applications, but nd an increase in attendance in 2011. This implies
that the simple DD estimator for attendance should be interpreted with care, as Scotland may not
provide a reliable counterfactual for what would have happened to attendance in England in the
absence of treatment. The model with leads and lags of the treatment indicator controls for these
di¤erent trends and provides a measure of the e¤ect on attendance in 2012 and subsequent years.
Looking across di¤erent types of courses, I nd that applications and attendance fell by more
for courses that lead to lower salaries and lower employment rates after graduation. There is also
evidence that STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) courses and courses at
more selective universities were less a¤ected by the increase in fees. This suggests that applicants
take expected future earnings and employment prospects into account when making their course
choices. Faced with a higher level of debt, students choose courses that o¤er higher labour market
returns after graduation. This implies that there is scope for tuition fees to vary by subject and
institution to reect this di¤erential in studentswillingness to pay across courses.
The use of applications data allows me to estimate the price elasticity of demand for higher
education. Most previous studies on the e¤ect of tuition fees on education outcomes focus on
attendance rates. Attendance is an equilibrium outcome, determined by the demand and the
supply of university places. While studies that focus on attendance rates confound the e¤ect of
fees on demand and supply, my analysis for applications isolates the demand e¤ect. Using data for
the entire period after the introduction of fees, I estimate a price elasticity of demand for higher
education of  0:4.
To examine the importance of credit constraints in access to higher education, I use the level of
participation in higher education by local authority as a measure of advantage and look at the e¤ect
of the increase in fees in 2012 on attendance for students from di¤erent backgrounds. I nd that
attendance fell by more for students from more advantaged backgrounds. This suggests that credit
constraints do not play an important role in the decision to go to university in the UK, perhaps
because student loans and policies adopted to widen participation  such as fee waivers, bursaries
and maintenance grants  are e¤ective in reducing the cost of higher education for low-income
students.
I also examine the di¤erential e¤ect of the policy changes introduced in England in 2012 by
ethnic group and gender. I nd a larger reduction in attendance for white students and a larger
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reduction in both applications and attendance for women.
This article contributes to the literature on the e¤ect of schooling costs on schooling outcomes.
The typical identication challenge in this literature  discussed, for example, in Dynarski (2003)
 is the fact that the cost of education is likely a function of omitted variables correlated with the
demand for education. Institutional changes that introduce a discrete shift in the cost of education
can induce variation that is uncorrelated with these unobserved determinants of schooling.
A number of studies use quasi-experimental methods to get around this issue. Most studies
focus on the e¤ect of tuition costs on enrollment. Deming and Dynarski (2009) review a number
of studies for the US and nd that most provide evidence that reducing college costs increases
college entry and persistence. The evidence for other countries also points to a negative e¤ect of
tuition fees on enrollment. Neill (2009) uses the political party in power in Canadian provinces as
an instrument for provincial tuition fees and nds a negative e¤ect of fees on enrollment. Hübner
(2012) uses the introduction of tuition fees in some German states in 2007 to design a natural
experiment and also nds that tuition fees reduce enrollment, by a similar magnitude to the e¤ects
identied with US data. Nielsen et al (2010) look at the e¤ect of a reform that increased the amount
of study grants in Denmark in 1988. Using variation in the level of grants as a function of parental
income, they nd that the increase in grants had a positive e¤ect on college enrollment, although
the e¤ect is smaller than in the US literature. Garibaldi et al (2012) examine a slightly di¤erent
outcome  the probability of late graduation, i.e., completing a degree in more than four years.
They use attendance data for Bocconi University and adopt a regression discontinuity design to
exploit variation in the level of tuition as a function of parental income. Their ndings suggest that
an increase in tuition fees reduces the probability of late graduation.
For the UK, a limited number of studies use quasi-experimental methods to examine the e¤ect
of fees on university attendance. Crawford and Dearden (2010) compare attendance rates of English
students living near Scotland and far from Scotland before and after the increase in fees in England
in 2006. The intuition for this identication strategy is that English students attending university
in Scotland still have to pay fees, but at a lower level than if they were attending university in
England. The results suggest that the 2006 reform did not have a signicant e¤ect on participation.
However, the authors attach little weight to these nding because participation trends prior to the
reform appear di¤erent for the two groups of students. Dearden et al (2014) focus on the increase
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in grants for low-income families in England, Wales in Northern Ireland in 2004. They compare
students from low and high income families and nd that the increase in grants had a positive e¤ect
on participation.
While there is a large literature looking at the e¤ect of schooling costs on attendance, few studies
look at the e¤ect on course choice. Rothstein and Rouse (2011) look at the e¤ect of a no-loans
policy introduced in a selective university in the US in the early 2000s. This policy replaced the
loan component of nancial aid awards with a grant. They nd that students responded to the
reduction in debt by choosing lower salary jobs, although they do not nd an e¤ect on the choice of
major or on academic performance. In two related studies, Sjoquist and Winters (2015a and 2015b)
look at the e¤ect of nancial aid on the probability of graduating from a STEM subject. They use
variation in nancial aid across US states and nd that the adoption of a strong aid program had
a negative e¤ect on the number of STEM graduates.
To my knowledge, this article is the rst to evaluate the e¤ect of the large change in tuition fees
that occurred in the UK in 2012 using quasi-experimental methods. It also adds to the existing
literature in two other dimensions. First, it looks at applications in addition to attendance, which
is the focus of most other studies. While attendance is an equilibrium outcome and is a¤ected by
supply constraints, applications have the advantage of capturing the true preferences of applicants
and isolating the demand response. Second, it contributes to the relatively small literature on the
e¤ect of tuition fees on course choice.2
The rest of this article is organised as follows. The next section presents the institutional
framework, summarising the main changes to tuition fees introduced in the UK in the last two
decades. Section 3 presents a simple model which provides clear predictions about the e¤ect of
tuition fees on the decision to go to university for students with di¤erent levels of access to credit
and for courses that lead to di¤erent salaries after graduation. Section 4 discusses the empirical
methodology. Section 5 discusses the data and presents descriptive statistics. Empirical results are
presented and discussed in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
2Another potentially interesting outcome is the dropout rate. In the UK, college dropout is low compared to other
countries. Data from HEFCE (2013b) shows that the dropout rate of rst-year students has been relatively constant
at about 8% between 2005 and 2011. This compares with a dropout rate of 41% in the US in 2013 (NCES (2015)).
Because the dropout rate in the UK is low, I do not study it as an outcome.
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2 Institutional framework
2.1 Evolution of tuition fees across UK countries
University tuition fees were rst introduced in all UK countries in September 1998. Fees were set at
$1; 000 per year, with the expectation that means testing would imply that one third of students
would not pay any fees.3 Since then, there have been several changes in the level of tuition fees, with
important variation across countries. In 1999, a devolution government was established in Scotland.
The new Scottish Parliament received separate legislative powers in many areas, including tuition
fees. From its creation, the Scottish Parliament adopted a distinctively di¤erent policy regarding
tuition fees from that followed in the rest of the UK.
Figure 1 shows a time line with the evolution of tuition fees in England and Scotland. In
Scotland, tuition fees were replaced with an endowment scheme in 2001. Instead of paying fees
upfront, Scottish-domiciled students were required to pay a total of $2; 000 after graduation if
their annual earnings exceeded $10; 000. In 2007, the Scottish government went one step further
and eliminated fees altogether for Scottish-domiciled students graduating on or after April 2007.
Students at Scottish universities qualify for no tuition only if they have been living in Scotland
for at least three years by the time they start university or if they have moved to Scotland for a
reason other than study. Scottish-domiciled students attending university in England still have to
pay tuition at the same rate as English-domiciled students.
England has also made changes to tuition fees since their rst introduction in 1998. In 2004, it
was announced that, from academic year 2006/07, upfront tuition fees of $1; 000 per year would
be replaced with variable fees to be paid after graduation if annual earnings exceeded $15; 000.
Universities had discretion over the amount of fees they charged, up to a maximum of $3; 000
per year.4 In 2010, the government announced that this cap would be raised to $9; 000 per year
for students entering university in academic year 2012/13. This announcement generated intense
discontent among students and led to a number of public demonstrations.
Although universities have discretion over the amount of fees they charge, there is evidence
3Students were exempt from fees if their families earned less than $23; 000 per year and were charged reduced
fees on a sliding scale if their families earned between $23; 000 and $35; 000. Students whose families earned more
than $35; 000 were charged full fees.
4This limit increased slightly every year in line with ination and was at $3; 375 in 2011/12.
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that most universities in England have increased their fees substantially in response to increases
in the maximum tuition limit. According to Universities UK (2009), almost all higher education
institutions in England chose to set fees at the $3; 000 cap from 2006/07. Regarding the most
recent reform, evidence from HEFCE (2013a) shows that, in 2012/13, 42 of 124 higher education
institutions in England were charging the maximum level of fees of $9; 000 and no institutions were
charging less than $6; 000. The sector average fee was $8; 040 in 2012/13 and $8; 507 in 2013/14.
Wales and Northern Ireland have also introduced changes to the level of tuition fees in recent
years. In Wales, the cap on tuition fees was also increased to $9; 000 in 2012, in line with England.
However, the Welsh Assembly pays fee costs above $3; 465 per year for Welsh students studying
at any UK university. This implies that Welsh students did not face an increase in fees in 2012,
regardless of where they attend university in the UK. In Northern Ireland, fees were capped at
$3; 465 in 2012 for Northern Irish students, but only if they attend university in their home country.
2.2 Student funding
Undergraduate students may obtain funding for maintenance costs and tuition fees through grants
and loans. Funding is provided by the government-owned Student Loans Company (SLC). Tuition
fee loans are available to all students, regardless of income and are repayable with interest. Main-
tenance loans are also repayable with interest and have two components: a non-nancially assessed
portion, which all students can receive; and an income-contingent portion. Maintenance grants are
a function of household income and are non repayable. The level of support provided under these
di¤erent forms of funding has changed over time, with signicant changes introduced in England in
2012, when the cap on tuition fees increased. Table 1, from Crawford and Jin (2014), summarises
these changes.
Looking at tuition fee loans, prior to 2012 students in England started repaying their loans
once they earned more than $15; 795 a year. From 2012, this threshold increased to $21; 000.
Repayments are made either until the loan is repaid in full or until a certain length of time has
passed (25 years before 2012 and 30 years under the current system), after which any remaining debt
is forgiven. The interest rate charged was equivalent to ination before 2012, corresponding to a 0%
interest rate in real terms. After 2012, interest accumulates at a real rate of 3% while studying and
0 3% after graduation, depending on income. The increase in the earnings threshold in 2012 made
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the system more generous, but the increase in the interest rate made it less generous. Crawford and
Jin (2014) analyse the impact of these changes on di¤erent groups of graduates. They conclude
that, on average, students who start higher education from 2012/13 will leave university with
substantially more debt and will take longer to clear their debt. However, lower-income graduates
will actually repay less, because of the increase in the income threshold for loan repayments.
Maintenance grants in England became more generous in 2012, increasing from $2; 906 to
$3; 250 for an annual household income of $25; 000 or less. However, maintenance grants have since
been scrapped and are not available for students who started university from 2016/17 onwards.
Maintenance loans also became more generous for low-income students in England in 2012. In
addition, the NSP was introduced in 2012 to give at least $3; 000 to low-income students, in the
form of bursaries, maintenance grants and fee waivers. As with maintenance grants, the NSP has
now ended and is not available to undergraduates who started university from 2015/16 onwards.
The increase in fees in England in the last decade led to a signicant change in the sources of
funding used by students. Figure 2 reports the percentage of English-domiciled students studying
full time at universities in England by funding source for payment of tuition fees. Until the increase
in fees in 2006, the fraction of students who borrowed to cover the cost of tuition was about the
same as the fraction who did not receive any nancial support for payment of tuition fees. The
increase in the cap on fees led to an increase in the fraction of students who pay their fees with
loans and a reduction in the fraction of self-funded students. This trend continued and in 2014 the
vast majority of students (81%) were borrowing to pay tuition fees.5
The average amount of debt of an English graduate on entry into repayment (including both
tuition and maintenance loans) has also been increasing steadily over time and stood at $24; 640 in
2016 (SLC (2016)). This is higher than the average annual salary of an English graduate working
full time six months after graduation in 2014/15, which stood at $22; 000 (HESA (2016)). By
contrast, student debt in Scotland is much lower (at $10; 500), because students do not have to
pay fees and only borrow to cover maintenance costs.
5Figure 2 refers only to nancial support for payment of tuition fees and not for living expenses. Many students
take out maintenance loans. For example, in 2000, 81% of students had a maintenance loan and the take-up rate has
remained high since then (Department for Education and Skills (2003 and subsequent releases)).
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3 Theoretical Framework
The model presented in this section follows closely the one in Cameron and Taber (2004). It is used
to derive predictions about the e¤ect of tuition fees on university attendance for credit-constrained
and unconstrained individuals and for courses with di¤erent expected salaries after graduation.
These predictions are useful for understanding the results of the empirical analysis.
In period t = 0, individuals choose between two schooling levels: not going to university (S = 0)
and going to university (S = 1). They enter the labour market at t = 0 if they do not go to university







where ct is consumption at time t,  is the rate of time preference, and  2 ( 1; 1) measures the
curvature of the utility function. This specication of the utility function ignores non-pecuniary
benets of a university education.
Individuals select S to maximise lifetime utility:
S = argmaxfVS jS 2 f0; 1g
Heterogeneity in credit access is introduced by assuming that some individuals have to pay a
higher interest rate to borrow while they are in college. I follow Cameron and Taber (2004) and
assume that unconstrained individuals can borrow at the market rate Rm = 1= in any period,
while constrained individuals can borrow at some rate R > 1= while in school and face the market
rate Rm after they enter the labour market. Individuals who do not go to university do not have
any credit constraints and face the market rate in all periods. This heterogeneity in interest rates
during school years could reect di¤erences in the ability to collateralise loans with personal or
family assets during school. I solve the model for credit-constrained individuals. The solution for
unconstrained individuals can be obtained as a special case where R = 1=.
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The lifetime budget constraint for each schooling choice is given by:
1X
t=0






t 1ct  I1 if S = 1
where I0 is the present value of income if the individual does not go to university; and I1 is the
present value of income if he goes to university, net of direct schooling costs.
The rst order conditions for utility maximisation are given by:
ct = c0; 8t if S = 0
ct = c0; if t = 0 and S = 1
ct = (R)
1
1  c0; if t  1 and S = 1
Substituting these values in the budget constraint gives:
I0 =
c0
1   if S = 0
I1 = c0 + (R)
=(1 )[=(1  )]c0 if S = 1
Solving for c0 as a function of IS and inserting into the utility function gives the lifetime utility





I1 f1 + (R)=(1 )[=(1  )]g1 

The present value of income (IS) depends on the schooling choice. Individuals who do not go to
university receive a wage w0t in each period t. Individuals who go to university have zero earnings
while studying and pay a direct cost  , which includes tuition fees and maintenance costs. After
graduation, they receive a wage w1t in each period t. The present discounted value of income for
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tw0t is the present value of earnings for an individual who does not go to
university, discounted to time t = 0 and W1 
P1
t=1 
t 1w1t is the present value of earnings for an
individual who goes to university, discounted to time t = 1.
Substituting in the lifetime utility values above gives:
V0 =
W 0 [1=(1  )]1 

V1 =
[(W1=R)   ]f1 + (R)=(1 )[=(1  )]g1 

An individual chooses to go to university if D = V1   V0 > 0.










Proposition 1 An increase in tuition fees makes it less likely that an individual will choose to go
to university.
The e¤ect of credit constraints on the decision to go to university is captured by the e¤ect of








(c0 + ) < 0
Proposition 2 An increase in credit constraints makes it less likely that an individual will choose
to go to university.







[(c0 + )(1  ) + c0(R)=(1 )

1   ] < 0
Proposition 3 An increase in tuition fees reduces the value of going to university by more for
individuals who are credit constrained.
Cameron and Taber (2004) do not examine whether the e¤ect of tuition fees on the decision to
attend university depends on the present value of earnings of a university graduate (W1). However,






(1  ) > 0
Proposition 4 An increase in tuition fees reduces the value of going to university by less for
courses that lead to higher salaries after graduation.
4 Empirical Methodology
The causal e¤ect of tuition fees on schooling decisions is identied through variation in the level
of fees in England and Scotland over time. In the baseline analysis, I focus on the increase in
the cap on tuition fees and accompanying changes in funding introduced in England in 2012. The
increase in the cap on fees raised the tuition cost of a degree from just over $10; 000 to $27; 000,
for students at universities that charge maximum fees. As a robustness check, I estimate a more
general xed e¤ects model, which considers all changes in tuition fees introduced in both countries
since 1998.
The baseline analysis is based on the following di¤erence-in-di¤erences model:
ln(ydjt) = d + t + Ddt +X
0
djt + "djt (1)
where d denotes country of domicile, j denotes gender, age group, institution and subject group
(as described in the data section) and t denotes year. The dependent variable is the log of the
number of university applications or the log of the number of rst-year undergraduates. The model
includes country of domicile xed e¤ects (d) and year xed e¤ects (t). The vector of controls
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(Xdjt) includes dummies for gender and age group and the log of population living in country d,
in gender and age group j in year t. The regressor of interest is Ddt and indicates observations
for students who lived in England before they started university (treatment group) in the period
after the change. For applications data, the post-treatment period goes from 2012 to 2015. For
attendance data, it goes from 2012 to 2014. The pre-treatment period goes from 2008 to 2011.
The analysis starts in 2008 to isolate the e¤ect of the increase in fees in England in 2012. Because
Scotland removed fees in 2007, extending the analysis to the period before 2008 would capture
the e¤ect of that change as well. However, I will also present the results of a xed e¤ects model
estimated on the full set of data (from 1998 to 2015), which captures the e¤ect of all di¤erent fee
changes that occurred in England and Scotland during this period.
The causal e¤ect of the increase in tuition fees and accompanying changes in funding that were
implemented in England in 2012 is captured by  and can be interpreted as the change (in log
points) in the number of applications or students induced by the policy changes. The specication
controls for changes over time in the dependent variable and for average di¤erences between students
from Scotland and from England. The key identifying assumption is that trends in the dependent
variable would have been the same for English and Scottish students in the absence of the policy
changes. The policy changes introduced in England in 2012 induce a deviation from this common
trend, which is measured by the DD estimator. Although the log level of applications or the log
level of the number of rst-year undergraduate students in England and Scotland may be di¤erent,
this di¤erence should be captured by the country of domicile xed e¤ects (d).
To check the common trends assumption, I add country-specic time trends in equation (1) and
estimate:
ln(ydjt) = 0d + 1dt+ t + Ddt +X
0
djt + "djt (2)
where 0d is a country-specic intercept, as before, and 1d is a country-specic trend coe¢ cient
multiplying the time trend variable t.
An important feature of the UK tuition fee system is that students at Scottish institutions only
qualify for no tuition if they have been living in Scotland for at least three years by the time they
start university or if they have moved to Scotland for a reason other than study. English students
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who move to Scotland to attend university still have to pay tuition fees. This is important because
it reduces the potential for selection bias. If students were able to qualify for no fees simply by
going to university in Scotland, we would probably observe that those who move to Scotland are
more likely to go to university, i.e. there would be a negative selection bias in the DD estimator.
The requirement that a student must have lived in Scotland for at least three years to qualify for
no tuition implies that membership of the treatment and control groups is arguably unrelated to
individual choices.6
Scottish-domiciled students still have to pay higher tuition fees if they decide to go to university
in England. This implies that some students assigned to the control group actually receive treat-
ment. In the language of experiments,  captures the intention-to-treat e¤ect. In practice, however,
the vast majority of Scottish and English students apply to university in their home countries. Fig-
ure 3 reports the share of applications to universities in the applicants home country. While the
vast majority of English and Scottish students apply to university in their home country, many
Irish and Welsh students apply to study elsewhere in the UK (mostly in England). Because my
analysis focuses on England and Scotland, the coe¢ cient  is a close approximation of the e¤ect of
the treatment on the treated.
Figure 3 also suggests that the share of Scottish students who apply to university in Scotland
increased slightly after 2012. This is a natural response to the increase in the cap on fees in England
in that year. This does not invalidate the use of Scottish-domiciled students as a control group,
because the classication of students into treatment and control groups is based on country of
domicile and not on where they decide to attend university. The increase in fees in England in 2012
may have a¤ected the decision of Scottish students of where they attend university, but they are
still a suitable control group as long as the policy change did not a¤ect their decision of whether
to apply or not. There is no reason to believe that their decision of whether to apply or not would
have been a¤ected, since Scottish students still have the option of paying no fees by attending
university in Scotland.
To account for correlation in the error terms, I report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
6The mobility response of students to changes in fees is studied, for example, in Dwenger et al (2012). The authors
design a natural experiment by exploiting changes in tuition fees across German states. Using administrative data
on applications to medical school, they nd that students are less likely to apply to universities in their home state
after the introduction of fees.
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clustered by country. These standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of error correlation
within a country. As emphasised in Moulton (1986) and Bertrand, Duo and Mullainathan (2004),
ignoring such clustering can greatly underestimate the true OLS standard errors. A practical
limitation of inference in my study is the small number of clusters, as there are only two countries
in the analysis. In this situation, standard errors tend to be too small, as discussed in Cameron and
Miller (2015). To account for this, Stata uses a small-sample correction and forms critical values
using a T-distribution with G   1 degrees of freedom, where G is the number of clusters. This
adjustment improves inference, although there may still be some degree of overrejection.7
5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data on applications were produced on request by the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service
(UCAS), which manages all applications to undergraduate courses in the UK. The information
provided is the total number of applications to English and Scottish universities by country of
domicile (England and Scotland), institution (156 universities and colleges), gender, age group (18
years and under, 19, 20, and 21 and over), and subject (16 categories), for the period from 1998
to 2015. Applicants are allowed to make more than one application to university. Until 2007,
each applicant could apply to up to six courses. From 2008, the maximum number of choices was
reduced to ve. Because this change applied both to England and Scotland, it is absorbed by year
xed e¤ects.8
Data on the number of rst-year undergraduate students were obtained from the Higher Edu-
cation Statistics Agency (HESA) via the Heidi portal and cover the entire population of rst-year
undergraduates for the period from 2002 to 2014. The data are disaggregated at the same level
as the data from UCAS.9 In addition, they contain information on ethnicity (white, Asian, black
and other) and the local authority where the student was domiciled before going to university. I
use this additional information to test whether the increase in fees in England in 2012 had a larger
7Because of this adjustment, the signicance values reported in the tables may not match the ones that would be
obtained if the critical values had been calculated assuming a standard normal distribution of the Wald t-statistic.
8Data from UCAS shows that the number of applications per applicant fell from 4:4 to 3:7 in 2008. Apart from
that year, the number of applications per applicant has been broadly constant in the periods before and after 2008.
This implies that the results that I obtain for applications should also provide information about the e¤ect of tuition
fees on the number of applicants.
9To protect condentiality of the data, cell counts in UCAS and HESA data are rounded to the nearest 5, with
cell counts below 3 reported as missing.
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negative e¤ect on students from minority groups or from local areas with low rates of participation
in higher education. Information on rates of participation in higher education by local authority
is obtained from the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) and is known as
POLAR 3. The numbers used measure rates of participation in higher education for people who
reached age 18 between 2005 and 2009.
To analyse the di¤erential e¤ect of tuition fees across courses, I combine administrative data
on applications with data on salaries and employment rates after graduation from the HESA Des-
tinations of Leavers from Higher Education (DLHE) survey. The survey covers the universe of all
graduates who were domiciled in the UK prior to attaining higher education (with a response rate
of 75%) and is conducted six months after graduation. It provides information on the activity of
rst-degree graduates: in full-time paid employment (including self-employment), in part-time paid
employment, in voluntary/unpaid employment, in further study and assumed to be unemployed. It
also reports the salaries of graduates in full-time paid employment and contains information on age,
gender, institution and subject. I use data for students who graduated in 2011/12 and calculate
average salaries and average employment rates by gender, institution and subject. To reduce the
e¤ect of outliers, average salaries are calculated for workers age 20 to 30 earning less than $60; 000
per year. The employment rate is dened as the share of the population of graduates in full-time
paid employment six months after graduation.
The model controls for the log of population by country, year, gender, and age group (obtained
from the O¢ ce for National Statistics mid-year population estimates). Between 1998 and 2015,
population aged 17 to 24 increased by 18:9% in England, compared with 10:7% in Scotland. This
should lead to a relative increase in applications and attendance by English-domiciled students,
regardless of the level of tuition fees. I account for this by controlling for population in the model.
The common trends assumption is investigated in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 shows the evolution
in the log number of applications in England and Scotland and Figure 5 shows the evolution in
the log number of rstyear undergraduates in both countries. The graphs on the left distinguish
between STEM and non-STEM subjects and the graphs on the right distinguish between selective
universities and other universities.10 The gures report data from the earliest available year to
10Selective universities are the ones in the Sutton Trust 30 group: Bath, Birmingham, Bristol, Cambridge, Durham,
Edinburgh, Exeter, Glasgow, Imperial College, Kings College London, Lancaster, Leeds, Leicester, Liverpool, London
School of Economics, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, Oxford, Reading, Royal Holloway, She¢ eld, Southampton,
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give a better sense of the underlying trends. However, because the di¤erence-in-di¤erences model
is estimated on data from 2008 onwards, the validity of the DD estimator relies on the assumption
that applications and attendance in England and Scotland followed a common trend between 2008
and 2011.
Applications followed an upward trend in England and Scotland between 2008 and 2011 and
then dropped in England in 2012, when tuition fees were raised. The drop was more pronounced
for applications to non-STEM subjects and to less selective universities. Applications by English-
domiciled students recover post-2012, especially for STEM subjects and selective universities.
Figure 5 shows that, as for applications, the number of rst-year undergraduate students in
England also dropped in 2012, especially for non-STEM subjects and for less selective universities.
Again, the e¤ect for selective universities and STEM subjects appears to be temporary, with the
number of rst-year undergraduates recovering in 2013 and 2014. For less selective universities and
non-STEM subjects, student numbers in 2014 remained below their pre-2012 trend.
These gures support the assumption of common trends and suggest that changes in fees have
induced a deviation from the trend. They provide suggestive evidence that higher tuition fees
discourage university applications and attendance, with important di¤erences across subjects and
universities.
To provide a more complete picture of the evolution of applications and attendance by country
of domicile, Table 2 reports the (log) number of applications and rst-year students by country of
domicile. It also calculates the change in log applications and log attendance between 2011 and
the latest available year (2015 for UCAS data and 2014 for HESA data). The table shows a clear
decline in applications in England in 2012. Application numbers have since recovered, but remained
below their 2011 level in 2015. At the same time, applications in Scotland have been increasing.
Looking at attendance, there is also a clear decrease in 2012. Student numbers recovered in 2013
and 2014, but remained below their 2011 level. In Scotland, the number of rst-year students was
broadly constant between 2011 and 2014.
In the next section, I go beyond descriptive statistics and use regional variation in the level of
fees to measure the causal e¤ect of the policy changes introduced in England in 2012 on applications
and attendance. I also provide two formal checks of the common trends assumption, as suggested
St Andrews, Strathclyde, Surrey, University College London, Warwick and York.
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in Angrist and Pischke (2009). First, I test the robustness of the DD coe¢ cients to the inclusion
of country-specic trends in the model. Second, I implement a test for causality in the spirit of
Granger (1969) and include leads and lags of the reform indicator.
6 Results
6.1 Initial estimates
The rst three columns in Table 3 report the results with the log of university applications as
the dependent variable. The results suggest that the increase in tuition fees and accompanying
changes in funding in England in 2012 reduced applications by 20:7 log points (26:3 in the model
with country-specic time trends). This is equivalent to a reduction in applications by between
18:7% and 23:1%. The last two columns in Table 3 report the results with the log of the number
of rst-year undergraduates as the dependent variable. Attendance decreased by 11:5 log points
(19:7 in the model with country-specic time trends), which is equivalent to a reduction by between
10:9% and 17:9%. It is reassuring that the results are robust to the inclusion of country-specic
trends, suggesting that the common trends assumption is reasonable.
These ndings support the prediction of the theoretical model discussed in Section 3 that
an increase in tuition fees makes it less likely that an individual will choose to go to university.
However, these results should be interpreted with some caution because, as discussed in Section 2,
the increase in tuition fees in England in 2012 was not the only policy change that occurred in that
year. Changes in maintenance loans and grants were also introduced for students from low-income
families and the NSP was introduced to widen participation. As a result, the actual level of fees
for students from low-income families would have been lower than the headline price of $9; 000.
The DD estimates capture the e¤ect of all changes to fees and funding that occurred in England in
2012, and not the change in fees alone. Section 6.4 presents results for attendance rates across local
authorities with di¤erent rates of participation in higher education. Because education is correlated
with income, those results illustrate whether the increase in fees had a larger e¤ect on high-income
students than on low-income students, who beneted from more generous maintenance loans and
grants and from the NSP.
With this caveat in mind, it is useful to think about what the DD estimates would mean if
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the e¤ect was attributed only to the increase in fees in England. Although this is not an entirely
accurate interpretation, it helps benchmark the results against other ndings in the literature. The
DD coe¢ cient for applications can be expressed in terms of price elasticity of demand for higher
education. The 2012 reform increased the cost of a degree from just over $10; 000 to $27; 000 at
institutions that charge maximum fees. A reduction in applications by 20:7 log points implies an
elasticity of applications with respect to fees of  0:11.
The DD coe¢ cient for attendance is easier to benchmark against other studies, because most
of the literature focuses on the e¤ect of college costs on attendance rates, rather than applications.
Deming and Dynarski (2009) summarise the ndings of a number of quasi-experimental studies
conducted for the US and report that an increase in student subsidies to higher education by $1; 000
increases the college attendance rate by between 3 and 5 percentage points. This is equivalent to an
increase of 5 to 8 percentage points for a $1; 000 increase in subsidies.11 Using UK data, Dearden et
al (2014) nd a slightly smaller e¤ect, with an increase of 3:95 percentage points in the participation
rate for a $1; 000 increase in student grants. The 2012 reform increased the cost of a degree by
$17; 000 and reduced the number of rst-year students by between 11:5 and 19:7 log points. This
corresponds to a reduction in the number of rst-year students of between 0:6% to 1% for a $1; 000
increase in fees. Evaluated at an attendance rate of 23% for 18 year-olds in 2010/11 (BIS (2014)),
a 1% reduction is equivalent to a reduction of only 0:23 percentage points in the attendance rate
for a $1; 000 increase in fees. Although the 2012 reform had a large overall e¤ect on attendance,
the change in fees was also very large. As a result, the e¤ect measured per $1; 000 is smaller than
that found in previous studies.
6.2 Anticipation e¤ects
The increase in the cap on fees in 2012 was pre-announced in October 2010. This pre-announcement
may have a¤ected the decision of when to apply to university. In particular, it is possible that
students who were deciding whether to take a gap year or apply to university in 2011, decided to
apply early to avoid paying higher fees. This would imply that part of the decline in applications
observed in 2012 could be explained by an earlier increase in applications.
The possibility of anticipation e¤ects was discussed by some commentators and policy reports at
11Conversion using the 2014 end-of-year spot exchange rate reported by the Bank of England.
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the time of the fee increase in England. For example, the report of the Independent Commission of
Fees (ICOF (2012)) looks at data from UCAS for the 2012 application cycle to study the impact of
the increase in fees in England. This report reveals that there was no indication in 2011 that more
18 year-olds were applying during that cycle rather than taking a gap year and applying at age 19
in 2012. Analysis by UCAS at the time of the fee increase (UCAS (2012a) and UCAS (2012b))
comes to the same conclusion that there is no indication of any above trend increase in application
rates in 2011 for 18 year-olds. Interestingly, when looking at the acceptance rate  dened as the
share of applicants that have been placed for entry into higher education at the end of the cycle
 the evidence in UCAS (2012b) shows an increase in 2011 for 18 year-olds. Therefore, we would
expect to see evidence of anticipation e¤ects for attendance.
To test for anticipation e¤ects, I extend the model by including leads and lags of the reform
indicator. This approach is similar to the one adopted in Autor (2003) to study the dynamic e¤ects
of employment protection on the use of temporary help workers. The coe¢ cients on the leads
and lags of the reform indicator are reported in columns (3) and (6) of Table 3. For applications,
there is no evidence of anticipation e¤ects, since the coe¢ cients on the interaction of the treatment
indicator with the indicators for the two years before the reform are insignicant. This nding
provides further evidence in favour of the common trends assumption. For attendance, anticipation
e¤ects are more apparent  attendance increased in 2011 by 7:4 log points, followed by a decline
by 13:3 log points in 2012, which is consistent with the suggestive evidence for acceptance rates in
UCAS (2012b). Looking at Figure 5 and Table 2, it appears that attendance decreased in Scotland
in 2011, which explains the positive coe¢ cient on Treatment group  2011. It also explains why
the DD coe¢ cient is slightly more negative after controlling for country-specic trends, since it
takes into account the fact that attendance in Scotland was falling just before 2012. The nding
of an anticipation e¤ect for attendance suggests that the simple DD coe¢ cient reported in column
(4) of Table 3 should be interpreted with care, since the common trends assumption does not hold.
The e¤ect on attendance should instead be measured by the coe¢ cients on the interaction of the
treatment indicator with the post 2012 dummies, reported in column (6).
The results on the interaction of the treatment indicator with the post-2012 years suggest that
applications in England remained relatively low in 2015, although the negative e¤ect is smaller in
2014 and 2015 than at the time of the increase in fees. Attendance numbers in 2014 were also
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still lower than they would have been in the absence of the increase in fees. The negative e¤ect
of the increase in fees appears to be gradually decreasing, with both applications and attendance
recovering since 2012, but is had not disappeared completely by 2015.
6.3 Heterogeneity across courses
One prediction of the theoretical model discussed in Section 3 is that changes in tuition fees should
have a larger e¤ect on applications and attendance for courses that lead to lower wages after
graduation. To test this hypothesis, I combine data on average salaries and employment rates after
graduation by gender, institution and subject group with applications and attendance data and
study the e¤ect of the increase in fees in England in 2012 at di¤erent quartiles of the distribution
of expected future salaries and employment rates.
Table 4 reports average salaries and employment rates by subject for students who graduated in
academic year 2011/12. The table reveals a large heterogeneity in average salaries and employment
rates across subjects. Graduates in medicine and dentistry have the highest annual average salary
(at almost $29; 000) and also the highest employment rate (at 92%). Graduates in creative arts
and design have the lowest annual average salary (at just over $16; 000) and graduates in law have
the lowest employment rate (at 35%).12 The table also shows that there is variation in salaries
across institutions, with graduates from selective universities earning over $3; 000 a year more than
those from other universities, but employment rates are similar for both groups of graduates.
To test how the increase in fees and accompanying changes in funding have a¤ected applications
and attendance along the distribution of expected salaries and employment rates, I use data on
average salaries and employment rates six months after graduation for cells dened by subject 
institution  gender. These data are from the 2011/12 HESA Destinations of Leavers from Higher
Education (DLHE) survey. I then take the distribution of all these observations and calculate the
quartiles of this distribution. Finally, I estimate the model including an indicator for each quartile
and interactions of these indicators with the treatment variable (Ddt in model (1)).
The results, reported in Table 5, suggest that the policy changes introduced in England in
2012 reduced applications and attendance by more for courses in the bottom two quartiles of the
distribution of expected salaries. Applications to courses in the bottom two quartiles of the salary
12The ranking of salaries across subjects is similar to the one reported in Chevalier (2011).
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distribution decreased by 25 log points, compared with 11:4 log points for courses in the top quartile.
Attendance fell by 16:3 log points for quartile 1 and 20:9 log points for quartile 2, compared with
11:9 log points for the top quartile. A similar pattern is found when looking at employment rates,
although the results are less precise. I nd a larger negative e¤ect for courses that lead to lower
salaries after graduation despite the fact that students who borrow to pay tuition fees only start
repaying their loans when their annual earnings reach $21; 000. Without this design feature of the
student loans system, I would expect higher tuition fees to have an even larger negative e¤ect on
applications and attendance for courses with poor job prospects.
The analysis by salary and employment quartiles combines two types of choices that applicants
make: the choice of subject and the choice of institution. To try to separate these two aspects, I
analyse the di¤erential e¤ect of the policy changes for STEM and non-STEM subjects and for more
and less selective universities. Because STEM graduates and graduates from selective universities
tend to have higher salaries, I would expect applications and attendance to be less a¤ected by the
increase in fees for these two groups. The results, reported in Table 6, show a much larger reduction
in applications to non-STEM subjects following the increase in fees in England in 2012. Looking
across institutions, there is evidence of a larger e¤ect on applications to less selective universities,
although the results are less precise. The results for attendance tell a similar story and show a
larger reduction in the number of rst-year undergraduates attending non-STEM courses and less
selective universities.13
These ndings are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model and suggest that
students take expected future earnings and employment prospects into account when making their
course choices. They are also consistent with the results in Chevalier (2011). He reports large
di¤erences in earnings by subject and calculates a graduate tax  in the form of tuition fees 
that captures these subject wage premia. His results suggest that there is some scope for charging
subject-specic fees. My ndings indicate that students are indeed willing to pay higher fees for
institutions and subjects that lead to better employment prospects after graduation. The nding
13 I have also adopted an alternative method to separate the choice of subject and the choice of institution. To
isolate the e¤ect on the choice of institution, given the subject, I look at the e¤ect on applications and attendance
for di¤erent quartiles of the distribution of wages and employment for cells dened by subject  gender. To isolate
the e¤ect on the choice of subject, given the institution, I calculate the quartiles for cells dened by institution 
gender. The results (available on request) are consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model and show a
larger negative e¤ect on applications and attendance for institutions and subjects that lead to lower salaries and
employment rates after graduation.
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of a larger negative e¤ect on applications and attendance for non-STEM subjects is consistent with
the evidence in Sjoquist and Winters (2015a), which shows that the adoption of merit programs by
some US states reduced the likelihood of graduating with a STEM degree.
6.4 Heterogeneity across a geographic measure of advantage
To test whether students from di¤erent backgrounds are a¤ected di¤erently by the increase in tuition
fees, I use administrative data from HESA on the number of rst-year undergraduates by local
authorities with di¤erent levels of participation in higher education. This measure of advantage is
commonly used in policy reports. UCAS analysis at the time of the increase in fees (UCAS (2012a))
suggests that application rates for 18 year-olds from more advantaged backgrounds  dened as
local areas with higher rates of participation in higher education  fell by more between 2011 and
2012 than those from less advantaged backgrounds.
The theoretical model discussed in Section 3 predicts that an increase in tuition fees should
have a larger e¤ect on applications and attendance for credit constrained students. In the model,
credit constraints are captured by a higher interest rate during school years, which could reect
di¤erences in the ability to collateralise loans with personal or family assets. Because my data do
not contain a direct measure of income or wealth, I use the local areas rate of participation in
higher education as a proxy.14
Table 7 reports the results of estimating model (1) separately for local authorities with low and
high participation in higher education. Local authorities are divided into two groups by the median
rate of participation in higher education of people who reached age 18 between 2005 and 2009.15
The results show that attendance fell by more for students from local authorities with higher rates
of participation in higher education, which is consistent with the evidence in UCAS (2012a).
These results are not surprising because the government provides tuition fee loans to all students
on similar terms. Students from low-income families have also until recently beneted from more
generous maintenance grants and from fair access schemes provided in the context of the NSP.16
14The rate of participation in higher education (from HEFCE POLAR 3) is strongly correlated with the fraction of
the population by local authority in managerial or professional occupations (from the 2011 Census), with a correlation
coe¢ cient of 0:86. This implies that there should be a good correlation between participation in higher education
and income. Therefore, this geographic measure of advantage should also capture credit constraints.
15To avoid small cell counts, data disaggregated by local authority are not disaggregated by subject.
16Universities that change tuition fees above $6; 000 need to have an access agreement approved by the O¢ ce for
Fair Access, setting out the measures that they have adopted to improve access for students from less advantaged
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These forms of support appear to have been e¤ective in relaxing credit constraints. These ndings
are consistent with evidence in Carneiro and Heckman (2002), who nd that only a small proportion
(up to 8%) of the US population were credit constrained in their decision to attend college. Dearden
at al (2004) apply the same methodology to UK data and also nd no evidence of signicant credit
constraints in access to higher education.
6.5 Heterogeneity across ethnic groups and gender
The theoretical model discussed in Section 3 does not make any direct predictions about whether
the response of applications and attendance to an increase in fees di¤ers by ethnicity and gender.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to test whether such di¤erences are present in the data. To investigate
this, I estimate model (1) separately by ethnic group and gender. For ethnicity, I only study the
e¤ect on attendance, since the data that I have collected for applications do not provide this type
of disaggregation.
The results by ethnic group are reported in Table 8 and show that the increase in fees and
accompanying changes in funding introduced in England in 2012 reduced attendance of white
students by 33:3 log points (equivalent to 28:3%), with a much smaller e¤ect for other ethnic groups.
The results by gender  reported in Table 9  suggest a larger negative e¤ect on applications and
attendance for women than for men.
6.6 A more general approach
The many changes in tuition fees that occurred in England and Scotland in the last two decades
provide multiple "experiments". So far, I have focused on the increase in fees in England in 2012.
In this section, I estimate a more general xed e¤ects model which uses information about the level
of tuition fees in both countries across all years:
ln(ydjt) = d + t +  lnFeesdt +X
0
djt + "djt (3)
The dependent variable is the log of the number of university applications and the main regressor
of interest (lnFeesdt) is now the log level of tuition fees in country d at time t. All other variables
backgrounds.
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are the same as in model (1). The model is estimated for the full period after the introduction
of tuition fees  1998 to 2015  and is specied in logs to allow interpretation of  as the price
elasticity of demand for higher education. This coe¢ cient has a causal interpretation if the level
of tuition fees is exogenously determined and not a function of omitted variables correlated with
the demand for education. In the UK context, this assumption is not implausible because changes
in the level of fees have been mostly driven by political events, such as devolution in Scotland and
changes in government in England.
To analyse the di¤erential e¤ect of tuition fees across types of subjects, I extend the model to
include an interaction between the log level of fees and an indicator for STEM subjects. Similarly,
to analyse the di¤erential e¤ect across institutions, I include an interaction between the log level
of fees and an indicator for selective universities. The results, reported in Table 10, suggest an
elasticity of demand with respect to fees of  0:356, which is larger than the elasticity found for
the 2012 reform alone ( 0:11). However, in the full sample applications to non-STEM subjects
and to less selective universities no longer appear to be more sensitive to changes in fees. Perhaps
applicants are more strategic about their choice of course after 2012 because of the large magnitude
of the increase in fees.
7 Conclusions
The level of university fees in the UK has changed signicantly in the last two decades, with
substantial variation across countries. This article exploits this variation to design a natural exper-
iment and estimate the causal e¤ect of tuition fees on applications, attendance and course choice.
It focuses on the increase in fees in England in 2012, which almost tripled the cost of a university
degree. This is a very large policy change when compared with previous reforms in the UK and
with reforms studied for other countries.
Using administrative data on applications and attendance, I nd that the increase in fees and
accompanying changes in funding introduced in 2012 reduced applications by 18:7% and reduced
the number of rst-year undergraduates by 10:9%. Behind this overall e¤ect, there are important
di¤erences by course. Courses with lower expected salaries and employment rates after graduation
were more a¤ected by the increase in fees. Looking across subjects and institutions, applications
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and attendance fell by more for non-STEM subjects and for less selective universities.
To examine the importance of credit constraints, I look at the e¤ect on attendance for local
authorities with di¤erent rates of participation in higher education. I nd that the increase in fees
reduced attendance by more for students from local authorities with higher rates of participation in
higher education. This suggests that credit constraints do not play a signicant role in the decision
to attend university. Looking across di¤erent ethnic groups, I nd that attendance decreased by
more for white students. I also nd some di¤erences by gender, with applications and attendance
falling by more for women than for men.
These results have important implications for future higher education policy.
The di¤erential e¤ects across subjects and institutions suggest that, faced with higher fees and
a higher level of debt, students choose courses that o¤er better employment prospects and allow
them pay o¤ debt more quickly after graduation. They also suggest that there is scope for fees to
vary across subjects and institutions to reect this di¤erential in studentswillingness to pay.
The ndings that attendance fell by more for students from local authorities with higher rates
of participation in higher education and for white students suggest that the increase in fees did not
discourage students from disadvantaged backgrounds from applying to university. These results
may be explained by the particular institutional context in England, where all students are given
access to government loans to pay their fees and universities are required to adopt policies to
improve access for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. When considering future increases in
fees, policymakers should continue to ensure that funding policies are in place to provide support
to students from low-income families.
The results by gender suggest that future fee increases may have a larger impact on women
than on men and may potentially be seen as discriminatory. Policymakers should take these het-
erogeneous e¤ects into account when considering further increases in fees.
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Figure 1. Changes in tuition fees in England and Scotland 
1998: Tuition fees 
introduced at £1,000/year 
No fees 
No fees 
2001: Endowment scheme. Students to pay 
£2,000 after graduation, starting with cohort 
graduating in April 2005. Only applicable to 
Scottish-domiciled students. 
Scotland 
2004: Announcement of variable 
tuition fees, with a cap at 
£3,000/year. Applicable to students 
starting university from academic 
year 2006/07. 
2007: No fees. Only applicable to 
Scottish-domiciled students. 
2010: Announcement of increase in cap 
on tuition fees to £9,000/year. Applicable 
to students starting university from 
academic year 2012/13. 
1998: Tuition fees 
introduced at £1,000/year 
Figure 2. Percentage of undergraduate students with domicile in England attending English institutions by 
main source of financial support for payment of tuition fees 
 
Source: HESA student database.  
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Figure 5. Log number of first-year undergraduates by country of domicile  
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Table 1. Changes to student funding in England in 2012 
 
Source: Reproduced from Crawford and Jin (2014), Table 2.1. 
Table 2. Log number of applications and students by country of domicile 
 Log applications Log students 
 England Scotland England Scotland 
2008 14.086 11.546 13.214 10.864 
2009 14.171 11.592 13.246 10.878 
2010 14.301 11.807 13.186 10.820 
2011 14.352 11.877 13.193 10.697 
2012 14.256 11.887 12.970 10.686 
2013 14.283 11.906 13.019 10.710 
2014 14.324 11.961 13.022 10.694 
2015 14.345 12.054   
Difference 2014/15 - 2011 -0.006 0.177 -0.171 -0.003 
Difference-in-differences -0.184  -0.169  
 
Table 3. Initial estimates 
 Log applications  Log students 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment group × post  -0.207*** -0.263***   -0.115*** -0.197***  
treatment (0.002) (0.004)   (0.000) (0.003)  
Treatment group × 2010   0.026    0.017 
   (0.007)    (0.003) 
Treatment group × 2011   -0.001    0.074* 
   (0.019)    (0.007) 
Treatment group × 2012   -0.218*    -0.133** 
   (0.022)    (0.005) 
Treatment group × 2013   -0.237**    -0.065** 
   (0.009)    (0.003) 
Treatment group × 2014   -0.182***    -0.079** 
   (0.000)    (0.002) 
Treatment group × 2015   -0.172**     
   (0.006)     
Observations 98,691 98,691 98,691  71,711 71,711 71,711 
R-squared 0.191 0.191 0.191  0.153 0.153 0.153 
Country-specific trends No Yes No  No Yes No 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Critical values calculated for a T(1) 
distribution to account for a small number of clusters. Regressions include year and country of domicile fixed 
effects, the log of population, and indicators for gender and age group. Leads and lags of the reform (Treatment 
group × year) are equal to one in the year indicated for students with domicile in England and zero otherwise. 





Table 4. Average salaries and employment rates six months after graduation 2011/12 
Subject Average salary (£) Average employment rate (%) 
Medicine and dentistry 28,988 92 
Engineering and technology 24,028 63 
Mathematical and computer sciences 21,922 57 
Architecture, building and planning 21,451 69 
Subjects allied to medicine 20,728 66 
Business and admin. studies 19,804 60 
Social studies 19,765 50 
Education 19,403 64 
Physical sciences 19,123 43 
Veterinary science and agricultural 
and related studies 
19,090 60 
Law 17,926 35 
Historical and philosophical studies 17,323 40 
Languages 17,266 45 
Biological sciences 17,021 42 
Mass communications and 
documentation 
16,581 55 
Creative arts and design 16,051 48 
STEM subjects 20,875 56 
Non-STEM subjects 18,368 51 
Selective universities 21,682 51 
Other universities 18,477 53 
Source: HESA DLHE survey.  
Note: Average salaries calculated for workers age 20 to 30 in full-time paid employment (including self-
employment) earning less than £60,000 per year six months after graduation. Employment rate is the share 
of the population of graduates in full-time paid employment six months after graduation. Selective 
universities are the ones included in the Sutton Trust 30 group: Bath, Birmingham, Bristol, Cambridge, 
Durham, Edinburgh, Exeter, Glasgow, Imperial College, King's College London, Lancaster, Leeds, Leicester, 
Liverpool, London School of Economics, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, Oxford, Reading, Royal 









Table 5. Differences by expected salary and employment rate after graduation 
 Log applications  Log students 
 By salary quartile By employment 
quartile 
 By salary quartile By employment 
quartile 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Treat × post × Q1 -0.248 -0.310  -0.163* -0.203 
 (0.049) (0.155)  (0.015) (0.069) 
Treat × post × Q2 -0.246* -0.132  -0.209* -0.141 
 (0.030) (0.137)  (0.023) (0.065) 
Treat × post × Q3 -0.223* -0.140  -0.125 -0.157* 
 (0.021) (0.054)  (0.043) (0.024) 
Treat × post × Q4 -0.114 -0.150  -0.119* -0.152 
 (0.093) (0.026)  (0.010) (0.033) 
Observations 67,494 50,481  51,291 38,985 
R-squared 0.294 0.354  0.225 0.279 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Critical values calculated for a T(1) 
distribution to account for a small number of clusters. Regressions include year and country of domicile 
fixed effects, the log of population, and indicators for gender, age group and salary/employment rate 
quartile. Columns (1) and (3) report coefficients on the treatment indicator interacted with an indicator for 
each quartile of the distribution of expected average salaries of graduates in full-time paid employment six 
months after graduation. Columns (2) and (4) report coefficients on the treatment indicator interacted with 
an indicator for each quartile of the distribution of expected average employment rates of graduates six 
months after graduation. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table 6. Differences by subject and type of institution 
 Log applications  Log students 
 By subject By institution  By subject By institution 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Treat × post × STEM -0.099**   -0.051  
 (0.002)   (0.026)  
Treat × post × nonSTEM -0.279**   -0.155*  
 (0.005)   (0.016)  
Treat × post × selective  -0.089   -0.084*** 
  (0.209)   (0.000) 
Treat × post × other  -0.247   -0.125*** 
  (0.074)   (0.001) 
Observations 98,691 98,691  71,711 71,711 
R-squared 0.192 0.192  0.154 0.158 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Critical values calculated for a 
T(1) distribution to account for a small number of clusters. Regressions include year and country 
of domicile fixed effects, the log of population, and indicators for gender, age group and 
salary/employment rate quartile. Columns (1) and (3) report coefficients on the treatment 
indicator interacted with an indicator for STEM and non-STEM subjects. Columns (2) and (4) 
report coefficients on the treatment indicator interacted with an indicator for selective 
universities and other universities. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table 7. Effect on attendance by level of participation in higher education in local authority 
 Log students 
 Low participation High participation 
Treatment group × post treatment -0.166***  -0.317***  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
Observations 12,700  13,882  
R-squared 0.156  0.129  
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Critical values calculated for a T(1) 
distribution to account for a small number of clusters. Regressions include year and country of domicile 
fixed effects, the log of population, and indicators for gender and age group. Local authorities are 
divided into two groups by the median rate of participation in higher education of people who reached 
age 18 between 2005 and 2009 (POLAR 3 data from HEFCE). 
Table 8. Effect on attendance by ethnicity  
 Log students 
 White Black Asian Other 
Treatment group × post treatment -0.333** -0.000 -0.056** 0.016 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Observations 14,183 7,779 8,629 8,149 
R-squared 0.181 0.077 0.192 0.190 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Critical values calculated for a T(1) 
distribution to account for a small number of clusters. Regressions include year and country of domicile 
fixed effects, the log of population, and indicators for gender and age group.  
 
Table 9. Effect on applications and attendance by gender 
 Log applications  Log students 
 (1) (2)  (4) (5) 
I. Women      
Treatment group × post treatment -0.237** -0.302***  -0.137*** -0.195* 
 (0.006) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.021) 
Observations 49,424 49,424  35,874 35,874 
R-squared 0.199 0.199  0.158 0.158 
      
II. Men      
Treatment group × post treatment -0.198** -0.233***  -0.088** -0.137*** 
 (0.013) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) 
Observations 49,267 49,267  35,837 35,837 
R-squared 0.185 0.185  0.147 0.148 
Country-specific trends No Yes  No Yes 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Critical values calculated for a 
T(1) distribution to account for a small number of clusters. Regressions include year and country 
of domicile fixed effects, the log of population, and indicators for age group. *** significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table 10. Effect on applications – full sample 
 Log applications 
 Baseline By subject By institution 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log fees -0.356**   
 (0.010)   
Log fees × STEM  -0.355**  
  (0.010)  
Log fees × nonSTEM  -0.358**  
  (0.010)  
Log fees × selective   -0.334*** 
   (0.004) 
Log fees × other   -0.360** 
   (0.012) 
Observations 196,048 196,048 196,048 
R-squared 0.220 0.220 0.225 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Critical 
values calculated for a T(1) distribution to account for a small number of 
clusters. Regressions include year and country of domicile fixed effects, the log 
of population, and indicators for gender and age group. Column (2) reports 
coefficients on the log of fees interacted with an indicator for STEM and non-
STEM subjects. Column (3) reports coefficients on the log of fees interacted 
with an indicator for selective universities and other universities. *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
